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Abstract: As Britain has voiced her opinion on the continued membership 
in the European Union and expressed her wish to leave its structures, it 
seems essential to provide an understanding of the impact of its exit in the 
legal and constitutional context. The following paper aims at presenting the 
background to the ‘in or out’ referendum on the UK’s membership in the 
Union, the complexity of the exiting route, the most immediate legal and 
constitutional consequences of the decision as well as the possible future 
implications in the internal UK’s relationship between the devolved nations. 
The article bases on a body of papers and analyses provided by several 
British and foreign institutions and authors published both before the June 
(2016) referendum was held and afterwards and attempts to examine the 
kingdom’s rights in revising its deal with the European Union, the outcome 
of the popular vote as well as its possible implications of the new situation.  
Keywords: referendum, European Union, Brexit, legal and constitutional 
implications 
 
Abstrakt: W sytuacji, gdy Wielka Brytania wyraziła swoją opinię odnośnie 
dalszego członkostwa w Unii Europejskiej i zdecydowała się na opuszczenie 
jej struktur, wydaje się niezbędne, aby wyjaśnić, jakie są konsekwencje tej 
decyzji w kontekście prawnym i konstytucyjnym. Niniejszy artykuł ma na 
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celu przedstawienie tła referendum w sprawie członkostwa Wielkiej Brytanii 
w Unii, złożoności procedury wyjścia, najbardziej widocznych konsekwencji 
prawnych i konstytucyjnych, jak również ewentualnych przyszłych impli-
kacji tej decyzji w zdecentralizowanym królestwie. Artykuł bazuje na szeregu 
dokumentów i analiz autorstwa brytyjskich oraz zagranicznymi instytucji 
i autorów opublikowanych zarówno przed czerwcem (2016), kiedy odbyło się 
referendum, jak i po. Przedstawia przyczyny dokonania rewizji kontraktu 
z Unią Europejską, wynik powszechnego głosowania i możliwe konsekwen-
cje nowej sytuacji. 
Słowa kluczowe: referendum, Unia Europejska, Brexit, prawne i konsty-
tucyjne konsekwencje 
 
Britain voted to leave the European Union in the referendum 
held on June 23, 2016 due to David Cameron’s unsound decision to 
resolve the political conflict at home. Although the ‘leave’ result was 
taken by a small but still substantial margin, it has already been 
confirmed as standing by the leading British politicians including the 
former Prime Minister, who stepped down as a consequence of the 
lost vote, and Theresa May, the newly elected Conservative leader. 
The picture that is emerging after the vote is that of a heavily 
polarised country, with Remain constituencies coming in more pro-
European than expected, and Leave areas more determined to leave. 
Geographically speaking, the first are located in Scotland, London 
and other major British cities; the others representing every English 
and most Welsh regions. Further, beside this internal complexity, the 
more immediate consequences of the referendum outcome are the 
steps that have to be taken by the kingdom to secure its future 
position both in Europe and in the world. 
 
Background to Britain’s 2016 referendum on leaving the EU 
The idea of holding a referendum on any political issue was 
practically unknown in Britain before the year 1975. It was the sove-
reign Parliament that was understood as “being exclusively represen-
tative” in the British democracy1. As Bogdanor remarks, the British 
                                                 
1 V. Bogdanor, The New British Constitution, Oxford and Portland 2009, 
p.173. 
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constitution “[knew] nothing of the people.”2 Yet, Dicey, a well-known 
jurist and constitutional theorist, acknowledged British people’s 
involvement in political matters already in the 19th century. In his 
opinion, they came to possess or, at least, share some of the political 
sovereignty in the state, leaving the legal sphere exclusively to 
Parliament3. What is more, in 1910, he declared that it was time to 
formally recognise the principle of a referendum, which in fact, if not 
in theory, formed part of constitutional morality.4  
The unsolved position of electorate in the political arrange-
ments of the Kingdom lay partly at the heart of the uncodified British 
constitution and the role it ascribed to the Crown – the source of 
sovereignty in ‘the people.’ Accordingly, the political culture of demo-
cratic Britain assigned to people the role of subjects, not of citizens. 
Such an arrangement was further reinforced by the relationship 
between electorate and the semi-public institutions, the product of 
the electoral system, in which people – the electors seceded their 
power to their representatives in Parliament, limiting even their own 
right to information.5 Having the above in mind, any referendum was 
to be treated as not legally binding, and easily ignored. 
It should thus come as no surprise that the first national refe-
rendum in Britain took place in 1975 and, in the light of the most 
conservative version of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, was 
preceded by a debate whether it was at all ‘constitutional.’ As 
Bogdanor reports, it was allowed to go forward after it was finally 
agreed that Parliament could choose to ignore its outcome and treat 
it as merely advisory.6  
The 1975 ‘in-out’ referendum was held to ascertain the right-
ness of Britain’s 1972 decision to join the then European Commu-
nity. It did not concern the principle of the entry alone, but its 
                                                 
2 V. Bogdanor, Power and the People, London 1997, p. 15. 
3 A.V. Dicey, Law of the Constitution, London 1885, pp.73-6. 
4 A.V. Dicey, The referendum and its Critics, “Quarterly Review”, 1910, 212, 
pp. 538, 550.  
5 C. Turpin and A. Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution, Cam-
bridge 2007, pp.494-495. 
6 V. Bogdanor, The New British Constitution, Oxford & Portland 2009, p. 173. 
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complex conditions. The Labour Party determined to resolve the con-
troversy regarding the whole Common Market debate both between 
and within the political parties which centred around the question of 
the entry’s terms. The outcome was a massive two-to-one vote in 
favour of remaining in the Community.7 Around 67,2% of electors, at 
a comparably high turnout, i.e. 64,5%, voted ‘yes’ to the question: 
“Do you think that the United Kingdom should stay in the Common 
Market?” Such a result seemed to cleanse the British politics of the 
longstanding debate on Europe in the isles for decades.8  
However, coming to terms with the European question in the 
eighties appears to be no longer in effect presently. For long, Britain’s 
membership in the European Community (presently the European 
Union) has remained a thorny point that transcended all major 
political parties threatening their split. Issues such as a derogation 
from one’s own sovereignty or democratic deficit within the Union 
itself appeared damaging.9 What the British denounced most was the 
fact that the EU’s legislature, which cannot initiate legislation, leaves 
this prerogative to the executive branch, in fact a group of unelected 
technocrats. Recent developments such as the migration issues, the 
rise of the UKIP or the dispute between Britain and the EU about the 
appointment of Jean-Claude Juncker as President of the European 
Commission again shifted the European issue from the margins of 
British politics to its mainstream.10  
Being under an increasing pressure from its own backbenchers, 
David Cameron committed the Conservative party to holding a refe-
rendum on Britain’s withdrawal from the EU or an attempted renego-
tiation of its status in his Bloomberg speech already in 2013. By doing 
this, he additionally strengthened his position in the 2015 parliamen-
                                                 
7 L.J. Macfarlane, Issues In British Politics Since 1945, Harlow 1981, pp. 149-
150. 
8 V. Bogdanor, The New British Constitution, Oxford and Portland 2009, pp. 
31-31, 176. 
9 N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the 
European Commonwealth, Oxford 1999, pp. 79-95. 
10 R. Flamini, European Disunion: Cameron, the EU and the Scots, “World 
Affairs”, 2014 (9/10), pp. 8-15. 
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tary elections. The decision was sparked by the then recent survey 
findings showing that a majority of Britons wanted to leave the EU.11 
By raising stakes so high, Cameron wished to ascertain that the 
developments in the party would not lead to more infighting. At the 
same time, he intended to oppose to the UE’s moves towards closer 
political union, as well as gain control over a largely unchecked euro-
sceptic agenda at home.12 Consequently, the in-out EU referendum on 
Britain’s membership held on Jun. 23, 2016 appeared to be an 
indispensible act to solve the awkward Britain’s relationship with the 
Union. As the former Conservative Prime Minister, Sir John Major, 
stated “[the relationship with Europe] has poisoned British politics for 
too long, distracted parliament from other issues and came close to 
destroying the Conservative party. It is time to resolve to the matter.”13 
However, the situation seemed extremely viable as it appeared practi-
cally impossible to weigh up all costs and benefits of leaving the EU. 
Besides, the referendum itself could not answer and resolve all the 
troublesome questions that underlied the UK-EU relationship. 
There were four demands forwarded by Britain before the refe-
rendum which would satisfy euro-sceptics and keep Britain inside 
the Union. The first concerned the economic governance of the EU. 
Britain sought reassurances that any further plans of euro zone inte-
gration would not undermine non-euro member states. Secondly, it 
expected limiting the EU regulation and pursuing free trade deals. 
Thirdly, it wanted its exemptions from the plans of ever-closer union 
favouring national parliaments’ sovereignty. Finally, Britain deman-
ded some measures that would restrict the free movement principle. 
While most of these, except the migration issue, seemed achievable, 
the situation in Britain before the referendum was held was far more 
different than the one Harold Wilson experienced in 1975, when he 
secured the country’s stay after short negotiations and some minor 
concessions. This time, the well-organised Leave campaign, high 
                                                 
11 J. Springford and S. Tilford, The Great British Trade-off. The Impact of 
leaving the EU on the UK’s Trade and Investment, London 2014, p. 1. 
12 T. Olivier, Europe without Britain, Berlin 2013, p. 8. 
13 J. Major, The Referendum on Europe. Opportunity or Threat. London, Feb. 
14, 2013. https://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/189227 
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expectations of new concessions and hostile public opinion towards 
the EU policies raised stakes much higher.14 
Furthermore, despite some concessions made by European 
states to satisfy the ‘four baskets’ of demands and Mr Cameron’s 
urging the country to remain, the result of the referendum confirmed 
the Britons’ wish to leave (with 52% if favour of the move with a refe-
rendum turnout 71,8%).15 Accordingly, the Prime Minister’s battle 
over Britain’s EU membership was called a phoney war and, for poli-
tical commentators, it seemed to be more like a self-inflicted wound, 
an unfortunate attempt to ‘renegotiate’ its own place within it.16  
However, the most striking outcome of the vote seems to be 
the institution of a referendum itself and its present-day constitu-
tional status. According to the constitutional law, it is not binding as 
long as the British Government officially triggers the whole exiting 
procedure and Parliament approves of it. It remains unclear what 
role public opinion would play in the present mechanism of constitu-
tional adjudication. As The Mirror survey indicated on June 21, 2016, 
most of the British Parliament members were against their country 
leaving the EU structures. These included 186 Conservative mem-
bers, 216 Labour, all 54 MPs representing SNP, pro-EU Lib-Dems, 
the Welsh Plaid Cymru as well as several Northern Ireland’s repre-
sentatives.17 If the 2016 referendum’s result is treated as merely ad-
visory, it might cause much discontent and political destabilization. 
Taken seriously, it will undermine the traditionnal rule claiming that 
it is not the people who are sovereign in the British constitution. It 
remains to be seen what the pro-Union Parliament decides – whether 
it holds a new election, acknowledges people’s will or takes its own 
decision. If it decides on its own, then what will it be? Will it follow 
                                                 
14 Cameron’s call to arms, “The Economist”, Dec, 12, 2015, p. 30. 
15 BBC News. The UK’s EU referendum: All you need to know, http://www. 
bbc.com/news/uk-politics-32810887  
16 Battling with Britain, “The Economist”, Dec, 12, 2015, p. 28. 
17 D. Bloom, How will my MP vote in the EU’s referendum? “ The Mirror”, 
June 21, 2016, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/how-mp-vote-eu-
referendum-8035476 
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people’s wish and establish a constitutional precedence or act 
against it? 
These are just a few questions that will weigh heavily on Bri-
tain’s nearest future. There are more to appear, not necessarily less 
complex ones, including how to strike preferential trade agreements 
or restrict the free movement of people.  
 
Exiting the EU: the route  
The idea that a member state may voluntarily leave the EU 
was introduced in The Treaty on European Union (2009), commonly 
referred to as the European Constitution, and it guaranteed the 
terms of legal right to withdraw.18 Formerly, any member state could 
practically secede if it wished so. In fact, some ‘precedents’ were set 
in 1962, when Algeria, the former French colony, left the then 
European Economic Community upon regaining its independence, 
and in 1985, when Greenland, part of the Danish Kingdom, voted to 
leave the EU. Legally, however, these withdrawals should rather be 
seen as “reductions of territorial jurisdiction of the Treaties through 
a Treaty change” ratified by all member states.19 Further, as a part of 
a member state, Greenland gained independence and left the Union 
automatically. What was also significant was that it was a unitary 
institutional entity, which is not the case with the United Kingdom.20  
Theoretically, before the referendum was run, there were seve-
ral other routes that Britain could have taken to exit the EU, each 
bringing forward some flaws. As Oliver points out, the first and most 
likely form of a Brexit was via a nation-wide referendum that would 
result in supporting Britain’s withdrawal. The second option was the 
British Government’s unilateral withdrawal, backed only by a vote of 
the House of Commons. Both were far more plausible than the re-
maining ones, i.e. the third possibility, which was the EU expelling 
                                                 
18 R. Ruparel, The mechanics of leaving the EU – explaining Article 50, Lon-
don 2015, p. 2. 
19 E.M. Poptcheva, Article 50 TEU: Withdrawal of a member State from the 
EU, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2016, p. 3. 
20 N. MacCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law, State and Nation in the 
European Commonwealth, Oxford 1999, p. 203-204. 
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Britain or, the forth option, making its life in the EU suitably uncom-
fortable. Finally, a Brexit could have come about due to a divide 
between the UK and EU on such a contentious issue as the Euro-
zone. Its development would have left Britain isolated in some outer 
tier. In that case, Britain would not have left the EU, but would 
rather have been left behind21. 
The easiest option would have been to let the British Govern-
ment withdraw unilaterally being backed only by a vote of the House 
of Commons on the bill annulling The 1972 European Communities 
Act. All that the bill requires in such a case would be to bring for-
ward a clause stating that “the European Communities Act (1972) is 
repealed”.22 Then, under international law, nothing, in theory, could 
have been done to keep Britain inside the EU. Also, the EU’s treaties 
do not have any legal force to stop the move, except compelling the 
EU to seek a negotiation. Further, under the uncodified British con-
stitution, the sovereign Parliament would not need to seek any 
approval of the British people. This, however, might not be well seen 
in the present-day Britain, which has run several sub-national refe-
renda on devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
Greater London Authority or a mayor election recently.23 Denying the 
British the right to decide in such a momentous moment might have 
led to severe political, legal and economic problems.  
Having included the nationwide referendum in the programme 
of new laws unveiled by the Queen during the State Opening of Par-
liament in 2015, David Cameron clearly determined the further route 
of legal and constitutional measures of the process. Because the 
referendum’s result is ‘out’, this automatically obliges make Prime 
Minister to trigger and activate Article 50 of The Lisbon Treaty. The 
article facilitates a voluntary withdrawal of a member state by indica-
                                                 
21 T. Oliver, The five Routes a British Exit from the EU Could Take, The 
Huffington Post, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/tim-oliver/eu-
referendum_b_ 5542483.html 
22 J. Murray and R. Broomfield, Cutting the Gordian knot: A road map for 
British exit, London 2014, p. 12.  
23 V. Bogdanor, The New British Constitution, Oxford and Portland 2009, p. 
173. 
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ting what measures must be taken in the two-year period. On noti-
fying the European Council of its decision, Britain will be presented 
guidelines for negotiations whose aim is to provide necessary para-
meters regarding the foundations of the final settlement, i.e. the fu-
ture relationship of the state with the Union. Some informal dis-
cussions may take place prior to the notification process.24 
Article 50 requires that any withdrawal agreement include 
a framework of future relations with the seceding member state. In 
other words, it implies an orderly and negotiated withdrawal. It does 
not oblige the member state to formally state the reasons for its 
decision. Finally, the Council of Ministers, after a qualified majority 
vote of approval (roughly two thirds) and the consent of the European 
Parliament, comes forward with the settlement.25 Following Article 50 
arrangements seems most reasonable, as they present the form of 
the withdrawal procedure. Any alternative mechanisms do not exist 
at present and would need to be devised and agreed upon by the rest 
of the member states. The options presented above, like “go it alone” 
or “unilateral withdrawal”, would seem too tricky and might bring 
forward undesirable outcomes. 
In spite of the initial shock at the referendum outcome, the 
vote’s result was already confirmed by Mr Cameron in his statement 
given on June 28, 2016, when he attested that: “a vote to leave is a 
vote to leave.” Also, Theresa May, the newly chosen Prime Minister, 
announced on July 20 that the decision to leave is irreversible, 
although the official negotiation would not start in 2016. What the 
British Government wants to secure at present is “sensible and or-
derly” departure , which will require some time to prepare.26 There-
fore, it appears most likely that Article 50 will be followed and Britain 
will cooperate with Europe so as to avoid chaos and preserve its 
strong position in the region. 
 
                                                 
24 R. Smits, The European Constitution and EMU: An appraisal, “Common 
Market Law Review”, 2005, 42/2, p. 464. 
25 B. Clements, Britain outside the European Union, London, 2014, p. 11. 
26 BBC News, Brexit: Theresa May says talks won't start in 2016, June 20 
2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-36841066 
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The legal and constitutional implications of the British with-
drawal 
Despite definite plans and statements concerning Britain’s lea-
ving the European Union, not enough attention has been drawn to 
the very proceedings of the move and their consequences until 
recently. It might be because the idea of leaving has always been in 
a way regarded as incompatible with the very nature of the Union, 
whose major intention is to work towards a closer unification. The 
implications however seem to be broad and involve the whole complex 
of duties, tasks or projects. 
First of all, Her Majesty’s Government needs to prepare a time-
table that determines the precise procedure for Britain to secede 
from the Union. Theoretically, the British government and the EU 
should spend no more than two years negotiating its withdrawal and 
the framework for a new post-withdrawal EU-UK relationship, which 
is a constitutional obligation. The period aims at concluding the 
secession agreement and any other resulting amendments to the UE 
treaties.27 It is to be followed by the UK-EU negotiations in line with 
Article 50 of the EU’s treaty. Separate negotiations could also take 
place within the remaining EU states to reflect Britain’s withdrawal. 
The final agreement negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) 
offered to Britain would be subject to the approval of the rest of the 
EU, including the European Parliament.28 
Britain’s effective secession will automatically require com-
pleting a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU during the two-
year negotiation period. It will ensure that the new deal is in place for 
Britain’s proposed withdrawal date, say, 2019 (unless unanimously 
exceeded), as outlined in The Treaty of Lisbon. Further, it requires 
commencing FTA negotiations with countries and economic trading 
entities outside of the EU from the year 2017. The decision concerns 
such issues as, for instance, Britain’s future complying with the 
Internal Market rules involving subsidies and protectionism, which 
will in some way restrict its position. Further, much depends on 
                                                 
27 B. Clement, Britain outside the European Union, London 2014, p. 10. 
28 House of Commons Library, Leaving the EU, Research paper 13/42, July 
2013, p. 20. 
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what agreement Britain is able to reach with the EU. If it is bene-
ficial, it will significantly reduce the economic risk for the state and 
its citizens. If Britain does not enter into any satisfactory solutions 
with the EU and decides to leave on a unilateral basis, the costs are 
likely to exceed those of retaining the economic ties with the EU.29 
Such an approach, though theoretically possible, might damage the 
kingdom’s chances of striking any preferable future relationship with 
the EU.30 
Besides, after leaving the EU, Britain will automatically dis-
continue its engagements with all European agencies and pro-
grammes: the European Monetary Union (EMU), the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB), the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as well as the 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) to mention the most important ones. 
It should discontinue all engagements in each and every area of EU 
policy. All other international programmes should also be termina-
ted. Only then, to complete the withdrawal procedure, HM Govern-
ment should repeal The European Communities Act (1972) by means 
of a parliamentary act in order to symbolically denote the formal 
discontinuation of the UK as a Member State of the EU.31  
Finally, the British are to decide which option they want to 
take in relation with the EU. The proponents to the UK withdrawal 
see the other European free trade arrangements as possible alter-
natives to the present EU membership. Firstly, the UK could re-enter 
the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) alongside Norway, Iceland, 
Switzerland or Liechtenstein. It could also negotiate a similar arran-
gement with European Economic Area (EEA) or stay outside EEA and 
apply for its own relationship with the EU. However, as Murray 
indicates, these options do not seem attractive as they might not 
solve any of the major reasons why the British wished to leave the 
EU, i.e. its democratic deficit, the costs and the immigration issue. 
The question of democratic deficit would not disappear and the costs 
                                                 
29 S. Berglung, Prison or Voluntary Cooperation? The Possibility of Withdrawal 
from the European Union, “Scandinavian Political Studies”, 2006, 29, p. 162. 
30 R. Ruparel, The mechanics of leaving the EU – explaining Article 50, London, 
p. 4. 
31 B. Clement, Britain outside the European Union, London 2014, p. 17. 
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would remain equally high as EFTA states are expected to contribute 
to the EU’s budget. Finally, EFTA membership would again 
incorporate the principle of free movement within EEA and the EEA 
regulations would still be imposed by the Brussels technocrats.32  
Alternatively, Britain could attempt to follow Switzerland, 
which is a member of EFTA but not EEA, and its ‘EEA-lite’ 
arrangement with this organisation. However, if she does that, the 
major reasons for leaving the EU would not disappear either. Britain 
might expect the same reaction as Switzerland does in case of 
controversial matters when the country’s proposals are questioned 
and the existing treaties between this country and the EU are 
threatened to be renegotiated. Thus, obtaining a looser, more trade-
oriented relationship with the EU, promoting a free prosperous 
economy, which underline the political debate and public sentiment, 
might not be feasible irrespective of the route Britain decides to 
follow. Other obstacles like a necessity to sign a number of treaties 
with third parties would also have to be reconsidered.33 
There is also an option of a ‘total exit’ both from the EU and 
the single market. If the UK follows this scenario, first it will need to 
resume its own individual seat and vote in its own right in the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), then, similarly to Turkey, seek to join the 
EU Customs Union and access the EU market under the WTO rules. 
Otherwise, it will have to negotiate a special deal from scratch under 
a new trade agreement.34 Only then will it become an ‘independent’ 
state regaining its sovereignty, and its institutions and agencies will 
enjoy their right to function on their own. The question remains 
whether such a model would be beneficiary to the UK in the world 
governed by tariffs, rules or arrangements. Also, any economic con-
sequences of the UK-exit are problematic to calculate.  
With reference to the EU budget and Britain’s contributions to 
the EU, the British gross contributions both to and from the EU 
                                                 
32 J. Murray and R. Broomfield, Cutting the Gordian knot: A road map for 
British exit, London 2014, pp. 6-10. 
33 B. Clement, Britain outside the European Union, London 2014, pp. 6-7. 
34 Slaughter and May, Brexit essentials: Alternatives to the EU membership, 
2016, pp. 7-8. 
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Budget should be progressively decreased by a similar amount until 
the completion of the two-year negotiation period. It might be assumed 
that, depending on its future relationship with the EU, the British 
annual contributions to the EU budget should be much lower.35 Also, 
the UK’s contributions to the EU should be reduced by 1/24 from the 
beginning of negotiations in 2017.36 Such a progressive reduction of 
costs will indicate the UK’s increasing separation from the EU. Not all 
estimates are so optimistic. Despite the formal secession, the British 
cost could still remain high. For instance, EFTA nations are expected 
to contribute to the EU budget according to the relative size of their 
economies.37 Any other relationship will definitely dwarf the savings by 
new regulations imposed on the British economy. Ultimately, they 
might amount to merely single figure reduction of the total cost of the 
kingdom’s present membership.38 
As far as trade is concerned, if Britain follows the most ‘inde-
pendent’ route, it will no longer be connected to the EU and its trade 
will not be regulated by the EU. After taking its own individual seat 
at the WTO, its trade with the EU as well as other countries will be 
carried out as already covered by the WTO, OECD or other alter-
native multilateral settlements and treaties in addition to relevant 
declarations of the Commonwealth.39 However, Britain will have to 
enter into new international trading treaties with the EU and third 
countries to supplement the WTO rules. It will no longer automati-
cally be able to use those that operate within the EU or those that 
the EU has negotiated for its members. This process may take years. 
Further, Britain might lose on the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership agreement (TTIP) that the EU is presently working 
                                                 
35 R. Lea and B. Binley, Britain and Europe: a new relationship, London 
2012, 16. 
36 B. Clement, Britain outside the European Union, London 2014, p.15 
37 D. Campell- Bannerman, Time to jump: A positive vision of a Britain out of 
the EU and in EEA- lite. London 2013, p.10. 
38 J. Murray and R. Broomfield, Cutting the Gordian knot: A road map for 
British exit, London 2014, p. 9. 
39 I. Milne, Time to Say No: Alternatives to EU Membership, London 2011, p.20. 
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on with the USA and thus be at a disadvantage to EU businesses tra-
ding with the USA.40  
Hence, in Schiemann’s view, the concept of sovereignty, 
understood as being freed from all constraints and allowed to go its 
own way or taking control over decision-making within its own 
borders, should not be overused in the discussion on Britain’s future 
relationship with the EU. A state’s own sovereignty needs to be 
shared with others even at the cost of waiving some of it. Otherwise, 
Britain is going to be left alone to negotiate with many other states 
on numerous issues, which is not the most effective way of making 
progress in the present day world.41  
Finally, British officials and employees of the Council Com-
mission and all EU institutions and agencies as a whole will settle 
the timetable and stipulations concerning Britain’s’ secession with 
the applicable EU authorities of the EU. The British representation at 
the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and all 
other institutions and agencies should be progressively decreased 
over the two-year negotiation period, in cooperation with the appli-
cable EU institutions and all member states of the EU from the 2017 
to 2019. Britain should also discontinue all engagement with the 
EMU, as well as the ECB and both the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) and Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). Lastly, after the with-
drawal, the kingdom will no longer be engaged in matters relating to 
EU immigration and asylum policies. Thus, theoretically, it might be 
said that Britain will regain complete command over its borders in 
2019, two years after the commencement of the negotiations.42 
Practically, it will have to subject the rules to some other restrictions.  
Despite what British eurosceptics might wish, Britain and the 
EU will remain deeply interconnected. The withdrawal will never 
mean “the end of Britain in Europe.”43 As Cameron himself acknow-
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ledged in the Bloomberg speech, leaving the EU would not mean 
leaving Europe, which was going to remain for many years Britain’s 
biggest market, and forever its closest geographical neighbourhood, 
“tied by a complex web of legal commitments.”44 The same position 
has already been taken by Theresa May who, in her talks with Angela 
Markel on July 20, 2016, confirmed that Britain would not “walk 
away” from Europe and that the “closest economic links” with 
Europe should be retained.45  
Whatever Britain chooses, whether to remain within the EFTA, 
EEA or enter its own much looser trade-oriented relationship with 
the EU, it will still be obliged to implement to a smaller or wider 
extent a large part of European directives and regulations.  
 
The vote and Britain’s internal implications  
A withdrawal from the European Union effects not only the 
member state’s foreign policies or politics but its internal polity as 
well, i.e. it brings forward a massive constitutional change. The 
change takes place on the most fundamental level, notably the 
position of the government versus Parliament. All the constitutional 
practices of a member state are going to be altered. More specifically, 
Britain’s secession means a transfer of power back to the national 
government. All other institutions and agencies will enjoy their right 
to function as individual units and the state itself will resume much 
of the former exercised freedom.46 Seemingly, the kingdom may 
finally robust the effects of Europeanization. 
Before however Britain sees which of the above is plausible, it 
has to start and properly manage the process of withdrawal. Britain 
needs a thorough plan on how to go through the whole process. For 
instance, it should establish a Ministry to deal with the transition 
from the EU Member State status to a non-EU Member State status. 
                                                 
44 D. Cameron. EU speech at Bloomberg. Available at: https://www.gov. 
uk/government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg 
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An advisory council should also be established. After the completion 
of the two-year negotiation period, the British Members of European 
Parliament (MEPs) should resign and its Trade Commissioner should 
step down. This should be implemented alongside a progressive re-
duction in the UK’s contribution to the EU’s budget.47 Simulta-
neously, with the proceeding arrangements concerning the new status 
within Europe (EFTA agreements or treaties) Britain is to limit its own 
involvement in the EU. During the whole negotiation process, it will 
continue its engagement in all European business except for partici-
pation in Council and European Council discussions or decisions.48 
Further, there are significant changes to take place within 
Britain itself; its legal system, trade treaties or personal positions to 
mention just a few. As for the legal sphere, the day after the 
notification of Her Majesty’s Government’s intention to secede from 
the EU, judgements rendered by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), which cover and affect numerous matters, such as corpo-
rations, individuals and the government, will no longer have effects. 
Only the British courts, including the Supreme Court and the House 
of Lords, both the highest courts, will constitute and apply EU law, 
with no regard to the ECJ. The EU Directives and Regulations 
assented upon before the notification of HM Government’s intention 
to leave the EU and invoking Article 50 of The Treaty of Lisbon, which 
have not yet been implemented into British Law, should accordingly 
not be applied49.  
However, to manage the process properly, British Parliament 
should bring forward a Leaving the EU Bill, based on The Public Bo-
dies Act of 2011, which will implement the legal succession from the 
Union after the two-year negotiation period. Its main task is to 
introduce a comprehensive survey or repeal of EU regulations.50 The 
process of change and the institutionalization of new policies will 
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take time. Further, it is going to be challenging as well due to due to 
the length of Britain’s membership. During the two year period until 
the UK leaves the EU, contradictory rulings issued by the ECJ and 
UK courts will have to be subsequently resolved by the international 
dispute procedure. In some cases, this will involve arbitration for 
determining the legal inconsistencies between jurisdictions of inde-
pendent sovereign nations. Other EU Directives and Regulations 
applied to the law in Britain should remain applicable. They are to be 
imposed solely by courts in Britain with no reference to the ECJ. 
Such an approach of handling the legal matters would provide 
greater certainty to British citizens, overseas governments and other 
important parties. It will provide greater clarity to handling the 
process in the globalised world and its economy.51 
In short, Brexit will result in a loss of forty three years of inter-
connection between the UK and EU law. Thus, in order to avoid any 
gaps or disorder, the British Government will in effect need to keep a 
large part of EU law by converting it into national law. It has to be 
remembered though that the affected law ranges from the rules on 
insolvency jurisdiction to vast swathes of EU health and safety, 
product liability, consumer protections or employment law applicable 
in the UK. Instead, Britain is likely to face a massive legislative 
review process. To make things more complicated, the UK does not 
possess a single institution for national legislation. Different branches 
of law, e.g. environmental law, fall within the competency of devolved 
administrations: the Legislature of Scotland as well as national 
Assemblies in Wales and Northern Ireland. Accordingly, four different 
replacements for a single European law are needed.  
Furthermore, even transitional measures are not going to be 
so straightforward as it is assumed. Numerous treaty measures will 
cease to apply once the UK secedes the Union. If they are to be kept, 
new primary laws need to be prepared by the British. The govern-
ment could simply pass a law that creates new laws similar to the 
UE Directives and Council Regulations and give them the status of 
parliamentary acts and change Commission Regulations into Statu-
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tory Instruments. However, this might not suffice. Such laws typi-
cally assign on-going roles to the EU Commission or other EU bodies. 
Thus, appropriate minsters or bodies need to be identified to exercise 
such roles. It will also be necessary to preserve the current British 
measures implementing Directives or supplementing directly effective 
EU law, whether they are in the form of primary legislation, Statutory 
Instruments under The European Communities Act of 1972 (which 
will be otherwise repealed) or under other UK Statutes or regulatory 
body rules, e.g. the Financial Conduct Authority and Prudential 
Regulation Authority Handbooks.52  
Presently, all the laws mentioned above are governed by the EU 
approach to interpretation, which is different from that of the UK law. 
HM Parliament has to decide whether to stick to the EU approach to 
any ‘co-opted’ rules or whether the laws should be read according to 
the relevant UK rules of statutory interpretation. Adopting the UK 
approach might increase uncertainty, because these laws were not 
written to be interpreted according to European rules. It might also 
result in an increasing divergence from the EU interpretation53. 
In short, a vote to withdraw is likely to have far more signi-
ficant implications for Britain than it had been imagined by citizens 
and politicians alike. The scale of the challenge ahead for the new 
government, parliament and business and administration agencies 
seems unprecedented. 
 
Brexit and the kingdom’s devolved dimension  
Another issue identified with the so called Europeanization 
effects points to the problem of the member state’s internal struc-
ture. The United Kingdom is not a unitary state. It will have to take 
into account the opinions on the lower level of governance, i.e. the 
Scottish Parliament’s as well as the Welsh and Northern Ireland’s 
Assemblies, which is more than likely to differ from the one in West-
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minster54. There is thus an issue of how the Union’s norms and 
adjustments, which have affected national identities, are going to be 
supplemented and by what. This dilemma will concern four distinct 
nations with their constitutive institutions. Further, the Union’s 
policies have altered national identities and resigning from the EU 
membership will definitely involve the society.55 In Britain’s case, this 
will concern four distinct nations with their constitutive institutions, 
identities and aspirations.  
Taking Wales as an example, one can notice how complex the 
issue has become over the last decade. Wales has benefited from the 
engagement in the EU’s policies and funding opportunities. In the 
years 2007-2013, the Common Agricultural Policy and Structural 
Funds are estimated to be worth more than €5 billion. There are 
others, like the Cohesion Policy or research programmes or environ-
mental ones, that bring equally impressive sums. Further, both the 
national Assembly of Wales and its government have important roles 
in implementing the EU laws, through which its own decision-
making role has risen.56  
As Jill Evans, a MEP and a representative of Plaid Cymru, the 
biggest Welsh party represented in the European Parliament, stated 
during the Strasbourg session on UK Referendum (February, 2016), 
the UK Government should only “have a mandate to leave the Euro-
pean Union if all four constituent parts of the UK vote to leave in the 
forthcoming referendum”57. In her opinion, Wales benefitted from the 
EU membership economically, socially and culturally. Thus, any 
discussion on the proposed changes had be considered in terms of 
their impact on the devolved governments of the UK. Wales should 
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not be dragged out of the EU against the democratic will. She called 
for a mandate to leave only if the four parts do the same. Unfortu-
nately, similarly to England, Wales voted for Brexit, with Leave cam-
paigners getting 52.5% of the vote and Remain ones 47,5%58. 
In contrast, a majority of Scottish citizens supported the EU 
membership. Having access to the EU institutions within all its 
devolved areas, Scotland has enjoyed an international profile and 
connections that would be beyond its reach, when it is left behind in 
the British national structures after the UK’ s withdrawal. Nicola 
Sturgeon, the Deputy First Minister of Scotland, already in 2012, 
foreseeing Scottish independence vote, announced that it would be 
her country’s intention to negotiate the terms of “an independent 
Scotland’s continuing membership of the EU.”59 Not much has 
changed since then in the terms of Scotland-Europe relationship 
apart from the independence project falling through. A recent survey 
conducted by The Guardian (March 2016) found that 60% of Scots 
would choose to remain in the Union, with only 17% favouring 
leaving the EU.60 The referendum vote confirmed this preference with 
62% voting for Remain and 38% supporting Leave.61 
Further, as Marquand notices, if Britain decides to leave 
basing its decision on a majority of the English and Welsh votes that 
overwhelm and the Scottish ones, there is a high possibility of the 
UK break-up. Then, Scotland might probably wish to stay in the EU, 
leaving England and Wales on its own. That might become a far more 
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painful experience for England, much than the constant self-
deception.62  
Likewise, Northern Ireland’s position, although different form 
that of Wales and Scotland, might suffer in the process. The EU 
membership has facilitated Northern Ireland’s engagement into 
European structures, the status of its institutions or regional deve-
lopment. It gave rise to the establishment of numerous north-south 
security, cooperation or cultural programmes. The UK’s withdrawal 
is perceived as a step backwards which might put Northern Ireland’s 
progress at risk again 63 The result of the vote was thus one for 
stability with 55.8% choosing to remain against 44.2% opting for 
leave.64 With the overall British decision to leave, there appears 
a ‘democratic imperative’ to let people of the whole island to vote on 
reunification. It is because leaving the EU seems to run counter to 
the wishes of the Irish people.65 
To sum up, there are also serious political consequences of the 
‘leave’ decision for the British themselves. Brexit may have an impact 
on Scotland and its future devolution settlement or independence 
aspirations. Scotland’s seems most complicated by the uncertain 
future within detached Britain. Likewise, Northern Ireland, which 
will become the only part of the UK that shares a land border with 
the EU, might be more interested in the all-island cooperation and 
a stronger relationship with the Republic of Ireland.  
 
Conclusions  
By voting to leave the EU, Britain has entered a period of 
uncertainty and economic adjustments. The process of disconti-
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nuation of the United Kingdom as a Member State of the Union will 
definitely entail lengthy negotiations during which the complex 
relationships currently in place have to be unravelled. The future 
outcome of the process, i.e. ‘benefits without burdens’ scenario 
propagated by the eurosceptics, will not be easily achieved, if at all. 
The British cannot compel the EU to provide them with what they 
wants. What Britain becomes in the nearest future will be shaped by 
what the rest of the EU and other powers such as the US are willing 
to grant it in terms of new political and economic relations. At the 
same time, a total neglect of the British aspirations will not solve the 
longer-term problem for the EU of how to deal with the country. 
Further, the Union without the UK will probably shift its directions of 
development, which makes the British or even European expecta-
tions concerning future plans based on the present-day arrange-
ments delusive. 
All the constitutional and legal options that Britain aspired to, 
i.e. no obligation to follow the EU legislation, no financial contribu-
tions or regaining control over its borders, will cause that Britain or 
the EU part definitely. Britain will remain a major European power 
and, unless there is some catastrophic change or disintegration of 
the Union, the EU will continue to be Britain’s neighbour, predomi-
nant political organisation and economic partner. Another outcome 
of the ‘leave’ vote is a vast legal sphere of arrangements, concessions 
and restrictions that have to be secured, which will definitely 
transform the British polity. It thus remains to be seen what ‘being 
outside’ is going to mean for Britain both in constitutional and legal 
terms.  
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